Cases of Note
Courts presume that the General Assembly is aware of court decisions that construe state statutes or the constitution. The Office of Legislative Legal Services will update this page on an ongoing basis and email legislators quarterly to notify the General Assembly of such court decisions. Cases that may be of particular interest because they meet certain criteria have been summarized and are listed below in chronological order of decision date. Summaries for cases older than a year are available in the Cases of Note Archive.
People v. Mena, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 22CA0563 (February 6, 2025)
Holding: Defendant was convicted of both unlawful sexual contact by coercing a child under § 18-3-404 (1.5) and sexual assault on a child under § 18-3-405 (1) for the identical conduct, but the potential penalty for unlawful sexual contact by coercion provides for a harsher penalty, namely requiring a mandatory prison sentence. Under Colorado's equal protection doctrine, the conviction for unlawful contact by coercion must be vacated and the defendant sentenced for sexual assault on a child.
Case Summary: The defendant was found guilty of unlawful sexual contact by coercing a child and of sexual assault on a child (SAOC). The defendant was charged and convicted under § 18-3-404 (1.5) of unlawful sexual contact by coercing a child by the means set forth in § 18-3-402 (1)(d) because, at the time of the commission of the act, the victim was younger than fifteen years old and the defendant was more than four years older than the victim and was not the victim's spouse. Unlawful sexual contact is a class 4 felony that carries a mandatory prison sentence. The defendant was also charged and convicted of SAOC under § 18-3-405 because the defendant knowingly subjected another not his spouse to sexual contact and the victim was less than fifteen years of age and the defendant was at least four years older than the victim. SAOC is a class 4 felony but does not require a mandatory sentence of imprisonment.
Under Colorado's equal protection doctrine, a defendant's rights are violated when two criminal statutes proscribe identical conduct, yet one punishes that conduct more harshly. The court recognized that, as the defendant was charged in this case, SAOC and unlawful sexual contact both have the same age and relationship requirements. The only difference between the two is that SAOC requires sexual contact, while unlawful sexual contact can be accomplished either with unlawful sexual contact or upon the child exposing her intimate parts. Thus, the court found that, as applied to the defendant in this case, unlawful sexual contact prohibits either the exact same conduct or less egregious conduct as SAOC, but it carries a mandatory prison sentence, while the crime with the more egregious result, SAOC, does not. The court held that the disparate punishments for the defendant in this case for unlawful sexual contact and SAOC were a violation of the defendant's rights under Colorado's equal protection doctrine. (For more information, contact Conrad Imel.)
No on EE v. Beall, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 22CA2245 (August 1, 2024)
Holding: The requirement in section 1-45-108.3, C.R.S., that an issue committee disclose the identity of the registered agent of the entity paying for the communication on certain election-related communications distributed to the voting public is unconstitutional and violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Case Summary: An issue committee, No on EE, was fined for failing to disclose certain information on election-related communications in violation of section 1-45-108.3, C.R.S., of the Fair Campaign Practices Act. As relevant to the case, section 1-45-108.3 requires an issue committee to disclose, on any covered communication supporting or opposing a ballot issue or ballot question that is distributed to the voting public, the name of the person paying for the communication and the name of the natural person who is the registered agent of the entity paying for the communication, if that entity is not a natural person. No on EE appealed from the order affirming the fine against it for failing to disclose the registered agent on multiple communications during the 2020 election cycle. No on EE argued that the registered agent disclosure requirement was facially unconstitutional and violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. A disclosure requirement on election-related communications withstands a First Amendment challenge only if it survives "exacting scrutiny" and is narrowly tailored to the government's asserted interest in requiring the disclosure, which must be sufficiently important. The Court of Appeals determined that the registered agent disclosure requirement was not sufficiently related to a sufficiently important governmental interest, including the asserted interest of providing information to the voting public about the issue committee's sources of funding or its "legal face". A division of the Court of Appeals therefore concluded that the registered agent disclosure requirement in section 1-45-108.3, C.R.S., did not withstand the exacting scrutiny of a First Amendment challenge and was unconstitutional on its face. (For more information, contact Rebecca Bayetti.)
Castro v. People, Colorado Supreme Court No. 22SC712 (July 1, 2024)
Holding: The court holds that an alternate juror may be substituted mid-deliberation.
Case Summary: During jury deliberations, a juror suffered a heart attack. An alternate juror was added, and the new jury convicted the defendant. The defendant appealed, alleging that the substitution of an alternate juror after deliberations had begun required a mistrial. The Supreme Court held that substitution of a regular juror with an alternate juror during deliberations raises a presumption of prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial, but that here the presumption was overcome. The Court noted, as it had previously, that the General Assembly should look at clarifying the statutes. (For more information, contact Jessica Chapman.)
Miller v. Crested Butte, LLC, Colorado Supreme Court No. 23SA186, (May 20, 2024)
Holding: A private release agreement signed by the father of a child injured in a ski lift accident does not absolve the ski resort of liability under a negligence per se claim that is based on alleged violations of the Ski Safety Act of 1979 (“SSA”) (sections 33-44-101 to 33-44-114, C.R.S.), the Passenger Tramway Safety Act (“PTSA”) (sections 12-150-101 to 12-150-120, C.R.S.), and related regulations. Because the father’s claim was not barred by the signed release agreement, the district court erred in dismissing father’s “negligence per se” claim.
Case Summary: A father made an online purchase of EPIC ski passes for himself and his minor daughter (“child”), agreeing to a release of liability, a waiver of claims, and an assumption of risks and indemnity on the child's behalf. While at the ski resort, the child failed at an attempt to sit on a moving chair lift. Allegedly, there was no operator or attendant at the load line to stop the chair lift or slow it down, and the father and child continued to move up the mountain with the chair lift. The child ultimately fell off the chair lift and suffered injuries that left her a quadriplegic. Father filed a lawsuit in district court alleging several negligence claims. The district court granted the ski resort’s motion to dismiss the father’s negligence-highest duty of care claim and his negligence per se claim. In an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21, the supreme court determined that the SSA and the PTSA were adopted for the public’s safety and that a violation of the SSA and PTSA, and regulations adopted pursuant to those acts, constitutes negligence per se if the violation was the proximate cause of the injury. A PTSA regulation adopted the American National Standards Institute’s guideline 3.3.2.3.3., which, among other things, requires lift operators to monitor the passengers’ use of aerial lifts. Further, section 33-44-103 (3.5), C.R.S., of the SSA states that nothing in that section limits the liability of a ski area operator for injury caused by the use and operation of ski lifts, and, pursuant to section 33-44-114, C.R.S., of the SSA, if any provision of law is inconsistent with the SSA, then the SSA controls. The supreme court further held that the SSA controls over section 13-22-107 (3), C.R.S., which generally allows a parent to release or waive prospective negligence claims of a child, noting that nothing in the legislation enacting section 13-22-107, C.R.S., expressly indicates the intent of the legislature to authorize liability waivers that would eradicate the statutory and regulatory duties that the legislature codified in the SSA and PTSA. The Colorado Supreme Court made no determination regarding the merits of the father’s negligence per se claim.
Freed v. Bonfire Entm't LLC, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 23CA0965 (June 20, 2024) and Hobbs v. City of Salida, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 23CA0073 (March 7, 2024)
Freed Holding: The general assembly did not intend for the exemption in subsection (11) to apply to a private entity's music festival simply because the private entity secured a local amplified noise permit. Rather, the property subject to the permit must be used by the statutorily authorized permitting entity. Lessees, licensees, and permittees are exempted from the Noise Abatement Act only to the extent that they are involved in a state's, political subdivision's, or other nonprofit entity's use of property. (Agreeing with the dissent in Hobbs v. City of Salida, 2024 COA 25.)
Hobbs Holding: The plain text of section 25-12-103 (11), C.R.S., provides municipal entities, such as the city of Salida, the authority to issue amplified noise permits to private entities to hold cultural, entertainment, athletic, or patriotic events, including concerts and music festivals, on the permittee's property.
Case Summary: Two recent court decisions, each involving the interpretation of an exemption to the state's Noise Abatement Act, have created an explicit conflict within the Colorado Court of Appeals.
The exemption was added in 1987 but was interpreted for just the first time this year. In Hobbs v. City of Salida, 2024 COA 25, a division of the Court of Appeals concluded that the plain text of section 25-12-103 (11), C.R.S., provides municipal entities, such as the city of Salida, the authority to issue amplified noise permits to private entities to hold cultural, entertainment, athletic, or patriotic events, including concerts and music festivals, on the permittee's property. The dissent in Hobbs argued that plain text of the subsection (11), considered in context, and alternatively, the legislative history of that subsection, authorizes a political subdivision of the state, such as a municipality, to issue amplified noise permits only to entities that will use property that is used by the political subdivision.
In Freed v. Bonfire Entertainment, LLC, 2024 COA 65, a different division of the Colorado Court of Appeals considered a case that was very similar to Hobbs and that also required interpretation of section 25-12-103 (11), C.R.S. Agreeing with the dissent in Hobbs, the Freed court stated that the General Assembly did not intend for the exemption in subsection (11) to apply to a private entity's music festival simply because the private entity secured a local amplified noise permit. Rather, the property subject to the permit must be used by the statutorily authorized permitting entity. Under this reading of the statute, lessees, licensees, and permittees are exempted from the Noise Abatement Act only to the extent that they are involved in a state's, political subdivision's, or other nonprofit entity's use of property.
People v. Herold, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 22CA1265 (May 16, 2024)
Holding: For a conviction of felony DUI under §42-4-1301 (1)(a), the prosecution must prove that the defendant had a previous DUI conviction. A description that a person with a prior conviction was a "Caucasian Male" with the same name and date of birth as the current defendant is, without more, insufficient to prove the prior DUI conviction.
Case Summary: A Sergeant responded to a call reporting an intoxicated individual passed out behind the wheel of a van. Upon arrival, the Sergeant found the defendant in the landscaping rock bed in front of the running van. After questioning, the defendant was arrested and later charged with felony DUI under §42-4-1301 (1)(a) that require prior convictions for DUI offenses. At trial, the defense argued in closing that although the defendant was sitting in the car drinking, that he did not drive it while intoxicated. At trial, the only evidence of the defendant's prior convictions were the Sergeant's video recording stating the defendant's name and date of birth and copies of records of prior convictions of a Caucasian male with the defendant's name, date of birth. The Colorado Supreme Court held that such evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the same person with prior DUI related convictions. (For more information, contact Chelsea Princell.)
People v. Vega Dominguez, Colorado Court of Appeals No. 21CA1144 (April 4, 2024)
Holding: When the identical conduct results in convictions under two distinct crimes having different penalties, equal protection requires that the conviction of the crime with the more severe penalty must be vacated.Case Summary: In this case, the defendant was convicted of both attempted patronizing a prostituted child and attempted inducement of child prostitution. The court found that the identical conduct formed the basis for both convictions. While both attempted patronizing a prostituted child and attempted inducement of child prostitution are class 4 felonies, attempted patronizing a prostituted child qualifies as a sex offense that is punishable by "indeterminate" sentencing that can mean a life sentence whereas attempted inducement of child prostitution is punishable by only four years in prison. Since the prosecution focused on the meaning of "prostitution by a child," which is language contained in the statutory definitions of both patronizing a prostituted child and inducement of child prostitution, the court of appeals found the lower court to have violated the defendant's right to equal protection under the law and vacated the attempted patronizing a prostituted child offense. (For more information, contact Jessica Chapman.)